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 Abstract 
 
We study the nature of individual demands for environmental regulation and for trade openness 
in the general equilibrium of a small open economy where the environment is an input to 
production. Differences in the ability of individuals to afford private mitigation of the adverse 
consequences of pollution is a central feature of the analysis. Private mitigation leads to an 
endogenous, unequal distribution of the health-related consequences of pollution across income 
groups in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, in contrast to much of the literature 
which assumes equal health effects for all. We show that when private mitigation is possible at a 
cost, trade polarizes the interests of rich and poor with respect to the stringency of regulation. 
Moreover, even though trade has the potential to benefit everyone, the poor may oppose trade 
openness because of a concern that laxer environmental regulation will then be imposed in the 
interest of the rich. We explain why and how heterogeneity in the intensity of preferences, and 
not just in their direction, is likely to play a role in the determination of collective choices with 
respect to the regulation of the environment and of trade. We conclude by drawing out the 
general implications of the analysis for the study of the political economy of the environment-
trade-welfare nexus. 
 
Keywords:  regulation, environment, pollution, private mitigation, trade, welfare, collective 
choice 
JEL Codes : D7, F18, Q56  
Résumé 
Nous analysons l'interaction entre la demande individuelle pour la réglementation 
environnementale et celle pour l'ouverture au commerce international. Nous abordons le cas 
spécifique d'une petite économie ouverte lorsque les individus peuvent prendre des mesures 
d'évitement contre les effets de la pollution. Les différences d'habilités individuelles à se 
permettre des mesures d'évitement constituent un élément central de notre analyse. En effet, 
l'introduction de mesures d'évitement coûteuses mène µa une distribution endogène inégale des 
effets de la pollution sur la santé qui correspond bien aux résultats d'études épidémiologiques. 
Ceci contraste avec la littérature existante qui suppose généralement que les effets de la 
pollution sur la santé des populations sont distribués de manière uniforme. Dans ce contexte, 
nous montrons que la possibilité d'échange international peut conduire µa une polarisation 
accrue des intérêts entre riches et pauvres en ce qui concerne la demande de réglementation 
environnementale. De plus, les plus pauvres peuvent tenter de bloquer l'ouverture au commerce 
et ce, même si tous les individus dans l'économie peuvent en recevoir un bénéfice net. Ceci est dû 
au fait que la demande de réglementation des plus riches peut diverger de celles de plus pauvres 
en situation de commerce, alors qu'elles coÄ³ncidaient en autarcie. Nous expliquons comment 
l'intensité des préférences jouera un rôle important dans les choix collectifs de réglementation et 
d'ouverture au commerce. Nous concluons par des observations sur l'importance du cadre 
d'analyse choisi pour l'étude de l'économie politique des interactions entre environnement, 
commerce et bien-être. 
 
Mots-clé: Réglementation, environnement, pollution, mesures, d'évitement, commerce 
international, bien-être, santé, choix collectif 
Classification JEL: D7, F18, Q56 1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the demands by individuals of varying incomes for
environmental regulation and for trade openness. The setting is that of a
small open economy in which the pattern of trade depends on the extent to
which the environment is used up in production. The di®erential ability of
individuals to privately mitigate the adverse consequences of pollution at a
cost is a key characteristic of the analysis.
According to epidemiologic studies, the adverse health e®ects of pollution
are not equally distributed across the population, as those with lower socioe-
conomic status tend to su®er a heavier health burden.1 For this reason, we
might expect that individual demands for environmental regulation will be
more intense among lower income groups. Similarly, whenever a country's
comparative advantage lies with the production of goods that are pollution-
intensive, it is reasonable to expect that opposition to trade openness will be
stronger among lower income citizens.
Simple application of economic theory, on the other hand, teaches us that
poorer individuals will demand laxer environmental regulation if environmen-
tal quality is a normal good.2 There is no reason to believe that environmen-
tal quality is not a normal good. But in the light of the epidemiologic studies,
that this characteristic of the environment leads poorer individuals to always
demand, in the end, less stringent environmental regulation does not seem
like a sensible conclusion.3 Indeed, a similarly straightforward application of
the normal good argument could also lead one to infer that wealthier indi-
1See, for instance, the empirical evidence in Ash and Fetter (2004), Pearce et al. (2006),
Brooks and Sethi (1997), Neidell (2004), Jayachandran (2008) and Evans and Smith (2005)
and the reviews of Brunekreef and Holgate (2002) and O'neill and al. (2003).
2This is the reasoning behind Larry Summers' fateful 1991 memo at the IMF, which
advanced that it may make sense for dirty industries to move South. In the theoretical
literature, Copeland and Taylor (1994) have shown that, based on the normal-good argu-
ment, a representative individual in a poor country optimally chooses lower environmental
standards and thus specializes in dirtier industries. The assumption here is that all ex-
ternalities are somehow internalized. If that is not the case, and at the other end of this
normative literature, is the analyses of Pethig (1976) and Chichilnisky (1994) who take
as given that environment standards are lower in some countries for exogenous reasons.
Hence, although these countries (also) attract dirtier industries, in their frameworks one
cannot be sure that trade does not lower welfare; it depends on what drives the choice of
standards.
3Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) provide convincing empirical evidence based on voting
patterns in California.2
viduals demand more restricted trade than the poor because it causes too
much pollution.
In our view, the normal-good reasoning, though correct in principle, is
missing two important elements that are required for a full understanding of
the environment-trade-welfare nexus, which are addressed here. The missing
elements are the multi-dimensionality of individual interests in the regulation
of the environment and of trade, and their heterogeneity both in terms of
direction and intensity.
To introduce and study both elements, we incorporate the fact that the
impact of pollution on health can be privately mitigated at a cost. This
straightforward consideration has far-reaching implications. First of all, it
yields an endogenous, unequal distribution of the health related consequences
of pollution across income groups in a manner consistent with epidemiologic
studies, in contrast to much of the literature which assumes equal health
e®ects for all.4 Secondly, it leads to a general equilibrium in the small open
economy analyzed here in which the normal-good-based prediction about the
relationship between income levels and the demand for regulation, of either
the environment or of trade, does not always, or even usually, hold.5
Our approach includes another unusual feature, one not found in most
of the existing frameworks used for the political-economic analysis of trade.
We assume that, a priori, individuals di®er only by the magnitude of their
claims on national income. We thus take a di®erent route than those who
blend classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory with a median-voter or other model of
public policy by identifying interests in the electorate primarily with capital-
labor ratios.6 The reason is that individual interests in our framework depend
importantly on the ability to privately mitigate the e®ects of pollution, and
this ability is a function of income whatever its source.
The analysis is conducted using a model of a small-open economy with
Ricardian production technology in which private mitigation is embedded.
4 Existing political-economic analyses of the relationship between the environment and
trade typically assume equal health e®ects for all (see Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998),
Schleich (1999), McAusland (2003) and Copeland and Taylor (2003)). And yet, news
stories about how it is the poorest within the developing countries which are a®ected
by pollution are legion (see, for instance, Bernard (2006), Bradsher and Barboza (2006),
French (2005) or The Economist (2005)).
5For a theoretical perspective on optimal environmental regulation in the presence
of private mitigation, see Coase (1960), Shibata and Winrich (1983) and McKitrick and
Collinge (2002).
6See, for instance, Mayer (1984) and McAusland (2003).3
For a given degree of environmental regulation, we show that even where
trade openness leads to a more polluted environment compared to autarky,
the demand for pollution regulation can be weaker for a range of high-income
individuals. This is because the additional income that trade generates al-
lows them to be much better insulated from pollution. But since the trade
gain e®ect may be weaker for low-income individuals, more trade may also
strengthen their demand for environmental regulation, and thus increase the
polarization of interests.
The foregoing does not imply that the poor necessarily lose from trade.
To see why, we begin with a case in which interests over regulation strin-
gency in autarky are similar across all income groups. We then show that
by ¯xing regulation at the overall autarky-preferred level, trade has the po-
tential to improve welfare for people at all income levels. The problem is
that environmental regulation can be changed and, in our example, inter-
ests over regulation do diverge with trade. The newly preferred regulation
level for high-income individuals, if chosen, decreases welfare for low-income
individuals when compared to the autarkic equilibrium. As a result, if the
high-income group has its way over pollution regulation, trade then makes
low-income individuals worse o®. The poor may thus attempt to block freer
trade even though it has the potential to improve aggregate welfare.7
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we de¯ne individual wel-
fare and introduce the production and pollution-mitigating technologies. We
solve for individual consumption and defensive e®ort decisions in section 3,
allowing for corner solutions where no private defense, or a complete de-
fense may occur. These elements are introduced into a general equilibrium
framework in sections 4 and 5 for both a closed and a small-open economy. In
section 6, we consider the e®ects on individual welfare of changes in the strin-
gency of environmental regulation, and in 7 we study the role of trade regimes
in determining the demand for environmental regulation. Using simulation,
in section 8 we analyze the relationship between environmental regulation,
the demand for trade openness and welfare. We conclude by drawing out the
general implications of the analysis for the study of the political economy of
the relationship between the environment and trade.
7It is of interest to note that this result is consistent with the shift of emphasis from
anti- to alter-mondialisation among some French globalization protest movements. They
do not oppose trade per se, but rather the type of trade that they observe.4
2 The model
2.1 Individual welfare
In its bare form, individual welfare depends positively on the health condition
and the consumption of goods and services, though at a decreasing rate
for the latter. Let U(i) denote the welfare level of individual i, x(i) his
consumption level and h(i) his health condition. We have
U(i) = U(x(i);h(i)); with Ux > 0;Uxx < 0;Uh > 0: (1)
Pollution has adverse consequences on health, but this can be privately
mitigated at a cost.8 With a decreasing marginal utility of consumption,
environmental quality is a normal good. Let Q denotes the economy-wide
pollution level and d(i) the pollution mitigation e®ort for i. We have
h(i) = h(d(i);Q); with hQ · 0 and hd ¸ 0: (2)
For the general-equilibrium analysis, we shall adopt a logarithmic form
for consumption utility and a linear form for private mitigation; that is,
U(i) = ln(x(i)) ¡ (±0 ¡ ±1d(i))Q: (3)
Parameters ±0 and ±1 summarize the private-mitigation technology. In the
absence of pollution (Q = 0), or with maximum private mitigation (d(i) =
±0=±1), i's health condition attains its maximum. With Q > 0, the extent
to which i's health is a®ected by pollution decreases with his own pollution-
mitigation e®ort d(i).
2.2 The production technology
We assume an economy with two types of goods, denoted 1 and 2. Good 2 is
a dirty good in the sense that its production increases pollution while good 1
is clean and does not pollute at all. Production uses a ricardian technology as
represented by the following national production possibility frontier (PPF):
Z2 = ^ Z2 ¡ bZ1; (4)
8Examples of pollution mitigation measures include choice of house location, instal-
lation of household water ¯ltration system, drinking bottled water, fetching water at a
distance, chlorine pills, air cleaning system, weekends at the mountain, asthma medicines,
etc. See, for instance, Neidell (2004), Hanna (2007) and Rosado (2006).5
where Z2 and Z1 respectively denote the aggregate outputs of goods 2 and
1, parameter b is the constant opportunity cost of producing an extra unit of
good 1 in terms of good 2, and ^ Z2 measures the height of the PPF (an index
of the country's total production capacity). With good 2 as the num¶ eraire
good and good 1 selling at price p, the national income is
Y = pZ1 + Z2: (5)
2.3 Individual income
The economy is composed of a continuum of individual types indexed by i 2
[0;1] and distributed according to density function f(i). The total population
size normalized to one. A priori, individuals di®er solely by their claim on the
national income, which is expressed as the exogenous share ®(i). Individual
income is thus
y(i) = ®(i)Y: (6)
Individuals are ranked so that ®(i) is non-decreasing in i. Note that this rep-
resentation of heterogeneity allows us to concentrate on individuals' divergent
interests based solely on wealth di®erences and do away with di®erences in
the sources of income, such as the capital-labor ratios.
Remark: We could equivalently assume that each individual can produce
either of the two goods using the same ricardian production technology. The
individual production possibility frontier is then given by
z2(i) = ^ z2(i) ¡ bz1(i); (7)
where z2(i) and z1(i) respectively denote individual i's output of goods 2
and 1, while ^ z2(i) is a measure of individual i's wealth. We then have ^ Z2 ´ R 1
0 ^ z2(i)f(i)di and ®(i) = ^ z2(i)= ^ Z2. Both formulations are equivalent under
price-taking behavior.
2.4 Individual expenditures
Let goods 1 and 2 be imperfect substitutes as consumption goods. We rep-
resent this by using the following Cobb-Douglas form: x(i) = x1(i)ax2(i)1¡a,
where x1(i) and x2(i) respectively denote the quantities of goods 1 and 2
being used for consumption. Consumption expenditures are thus given by6
e(i) = c(p)x(i), where c(p) = a¡a(1¡a)a¡1pA. We shall also make use of the
fact that x(i) = v(p)e(i), where v(p) = 1=c(p).
In a similar fashion, goods 1 and 2 are used as imperfect substitutes
in order to attain a level d(i) of private pollution-mitigation e®ort. This is
represented by the following Cobb-Douglas technology: d(i) = d1(i)¯d2(i)1¡¯,
where d1(i) and d2(i) respectively denote the quantities of goods 1 and 2 being
used for pollution mitigation. To simplify, we shall assume that a = ¯.9
Private mitigation expenditures are thus equal to c(p)d(i). This yields the
following individual budget constraint:
e(i) · ®(i)Y ¡ c(p)d(i): (8)
2.5 Pollution and its regulation
In the absence of environmental regulation, the economy-wide pollution level
Q is simply given by Q = Z2; that is, each unit of good 2 produces one
unit of pollution. Environmental regulation requires the suppliers of good
2 to produce in a cleaner way. Some productive resources must be devoted
to either cleaning up along the production process or using more sophis-
ticated, cleaner production techniques. Either way, in comparison to the
no-intervention case, environmental regulation has two direct e®ects:
i) A bene¯t in the form of less pollution for any production level Z2;
ii) A cost in the form of more inputs necessary to achieve any output level
Z2.
Let us de¯ne the stringency of environmental regulation as a continuous
variable µ 2 (0;1). µ = 0 imposes no restriction on emissions, while µ = 1 is
an obligation to abate all emissions. The bene¯ts and costs of regulation are
represented as follows:
Bene¯t: Q = h(µ)Z2; with h
0(µ) < 0; h(0) = 1 and h(1) = 0; (9)
Cost: Z2 = (1 ¡ µ)( ^ Z2 ¡ bZ1): (10)
9This assumption raises the issue of the relative pollution intensity of the consumption
bundle versus the pollution mitigation e®ort bundle. If ¯ > a, then mitigation e®orts are
less pollution intensive than the mix of consumption goods, and conversely for ¯ < a.
But there is a priori no reason to believe that pollution defensive measures are any more
or any less pollution intensive than the mix of consumption goods on average. For this
reason, we adopt the neutral position that ¯ = a, which also simpli¯es the analysis.7
One may note, from (10), that regulation results in a downward shift of the
PPF: for any given amount of Z1 produced, less of Z2 is produced. Moreover,
a pollution-free output of good 2 is prohibitively costly. From a producer's
point of view, environmental regulation simply increases the opportunity cost
of producing the dirty good from 1=b to 1=(1¡µ)b in terms of the clean goods.
The maximum amount of the clean good that can be produced is not a®ected
by environmental regulation. We shall refer to equation (10) as the regulated
production possibility frontier (RPPF). Figure 1 illustrates the e®ect of





Z2 = ^ Z2 ¡ bZ1




(1 ¡ µ) ^ Z2
Figure 1: The regulated production possibility frontier
3 Output and consumption decisions
We assume price-taking behavior throughout.
3.1 The production decisions
3.1.1 Autarky
Under the assumption of a ricardian technology, the opportunity cost of good
1 is constant in terms of good 2 and equal to (1 ¡ µ)b. Therefore, if both8
goods are produced, we have pA = (1 ¡ µ)b. The autarky national income is
YA = (1 ¡ µ)bZ1 + Z2. Substituting the RPPF in (10), we obtain
YA = (1 ¡ µ) ^ Z2; (11)
where subscript A refers to autarky.
3.1.2 Trade
We consider the case of a small open economy. The world price of good 1 is
¯xed at pT. There are two polar cases to consider.
Specialization in the clean good If pT ¸ (1 ¡ µ)b, only good 1 is pro-






where subscript T refers to trade.
Specialization in the dirty good If pT < (1¡µ)b, only the dirty good is
produced and there is pollution in equilibrium. The national income is given
by
YT = (1 ¡ µ) ^ Z2: (13)
Note that whether pT is larger or smaller than (1 ¡ µ)b depends on the
stringency of environmental regulation.
3.2 The consumption decisions
With the assumed Cobb-Douglas forms for both x(i) and d(i), the quantities
demanded for goods 1 and 2 are, respectively, a®(i)Y=p and (1 ¡ a)®(i)Y .
We now have to solve for the distribution of expenditures between con-
sumption and pollution mitigation. Substituting for x(i) = v(p)e(i) into the
utility function, the individual problem can be expressed as
max
fe(i);d(i)g
V (i) = ln(v(p)e(i)) ¡ (±0 ¡ ±1d(i))Q (14)
s.t. e(i) = ®(i)Y ¡ c(p)d(i): (15)9
The individual takes prices, pollution, environmental regulation and na-
tional income as given. Substituting e(i) for the budget constraint, the prob-
lem of an individual reduces to choosing d(i). The ¯rst-order condition for






+ ±1Q = 0: (16)
This condition simply equates the marginal welfare loss from a lower con-
sumption level to the health gain from an increase in the pollution mitigation
e®ort. Given that we must have 0 · d(i) · ±0=±1, we obtain the following
interior and corner solutions:
d





; e¤(i) = ®(i)Y ¡ c(p)
±0





























According to corner solution (17), relatively poor individuals whose income
share falls below ® choose not to spend on pollution mitigation because of
their high marginal utility of consumption. Conversely, solution (18) denotes
relatively wealthy individuals with income shares above ¹ ® who choose to
be completely insulated from the e®ects of pollution. Interior solution (19)
represents middle-income individuals who opt for a partial protection against
pollution. Note how the pollution level also tends to increase the pollution-
mitigation e®ort. The welfare maximization solution allows us to assert the
following:
Proposition 1 The environmental defensive e®ort (weakly) increases with
pollution and individual income, while the converse holds for consumption
expenditures.
10It is straightforward to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are
satis¯ed.10
We obtain the following indirect utility function:

























4 The general equilibrium
4.1 The general equilibrium in autarky





(1 ¡ a)YA®(i)f(i)di; (23)
= (1 ¡ a)(1 ¡ µ) ^ Z2; (24)
where (24) is obtained using expression (11) for the national income. In
autarky, given µ, the economic general equilibrium is fully described by the
following set of equations:
p
A = (1 ¡ µ)b; (25)





QA = h(µ)Z2A; (28)
YA = (1 ¡ µ) ^ Z2 (29)
and e¤(i) and d¤(i) are de¯ned according to either of conditions (19), (17), or
(18). The system has 7 endogenous variables fpA;YA;Z1A;Z2A;QA;e¤(i);d¤(i)g
and contains 7 equations.
4.2 The general equilibrium with trade
4.2.1 Specialization in the clean good
As shown in section 3.1.2, we have pT ¸ (1¡µ)b. In the absence of pollution,
we have d¤(i) = 0 and individual consumption spending is e(i) = ®(i)YT =11
pT(®(i) ^ Z2=b) (see (12)). In this case, consumers do not have any decision
to make; they just spend all their income on consumption goods. Note that
this is consistent with corner solution (17) when Q ! 0. Note further that
whether pT is larger or smaller than (1 ¡ µ)b depends on the stringency of
environmental regulation; as a consequence, whether this outcome obtains or
not hinges on the choice of µ, which can only be explained by the addition of
a political equilibrium concept; we shall discuss this point in a later section.
For now, the general equilibrium with trade and specialization in the clean
good is summarized by the following system:






¤(i) = ®(i)YT; (32)
d
¤(i) = 0; (33)





4.2.2 Specialization in the dirty good
We now have pT < (1 ¡ µ)b and the country produces only good 2. There
is pollution in this trade equilibrium, which is summarized by the following
system:
Z1T = 0; (36)
Z2T = (1 ¡ µ) ^ Z2; (37)
QT = h(µ)Z2T; (38)
YT = (1 ¡ µ) ^ Z2 (39)
with e¤(i) and d¤(i) being determined according to either of conditions (19),
(17), or (18). Since the price is now exogenous, the system now has 6 en-
dogenous variables fYT;Z1T;Z2T;QT;e¤(i);d¤(i)g and 6 equations as well.
5 Trade regimes and the e®ect of environmental regulation on
pollution
Since specialization in the clean good eliminates pollution completely, we
concentrate on the more interesting case where trade induces a specialization12
in the dirty good. For a given regulation level µ, equations (26) and (37)
imply that
QA(µ) = (1 ¡ a)¡(µ) ^ Z2; (40)
QT(µ) = ¡(µ) ^ Z2; (41)
where ¡(µ) ´ h(µ)(1¡µ). As should be expected, regulation a®ects pollution
through two channels: the cleaner technology e®ect and the higher produc-
tion cost e®ect. Since both tend to reduce pollution, we have ¡0(µ) < 0.
Pollution in autarky is a fraction 1 ¡ a of the trade level. This di®erence
is due to the fact that in autarky, the supply for each good must match its
demand, thus determining the relative output proportions between the clean
and dirty goods. With trade, however, demand and supply are disjoint. In
the case of a ricardian production technology, full specialization in the pro-
duction of good 2 results in a jump in pollution equal to a fraction a of its
output, precisely the share of the demand corresponding to good 1. This
leads us to assert the following:
Proposition 2 The pollution-reducing e®ect of an increase in regulation
stringency is smaller in autarky by a fraction 1 ¡ a of the e®ect with trade
and specialization in the dirty good.
Proof: It derives directly from equations (40) and (41).¥
Proposition 3 Compared to autarky and for a ¯xed regulation level, trade
with specialization in the dirty good induces individuals to (weakly) increase
their pollution-mitigation e®ort.
Proof: First, note that with specialization in the dirty good, we have YT =
YA. Given µ, trade causes both an increase in pollution Q and a decrease in
the unit cost c(p) of the pollution-mitigating e®ort. From (19), this results in
a higher interior d¤(i). As for corner solutions (17) and (18), it can be readily
veri¯ed from (20) and (21) that trade's higher Q and lower c(p) reduces ®
and increases ¹ ®.¥
6 The welfare e®ects of environmental regulation
We now wish to analyze how increased stringency of environmental regulation
a®ects individual welfare in the general-equilibrium setting, assuming no shift13



























The impact of regulation on individual welfare reveals itself through prices,
income and pollution. To gain insight, we analyze the price-income e®ect,
given by the ¯rst term between square brackets, separately from the health
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T(µ) = ¡ ^ Z2; (44)
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T(µ) = ¡
0(µ) ^ Z2: (45)






































where k 2 fA;Tg, ºA = 1¡a and ºT = 1. In each case, the ¯rst term between
square brackets denotes the price-income e®ect while the second one is the
health e®ect. Note that for ®(i) ¸ ¹ ®k, the pollution e®ect is nil since those
individuals are completely insulated from pollution. We begin by analyzing
the health e®ects.
6.1 The health welfare e®ects of regulation
We have the following:
11This approach should also be useful for the conduct of empirical work.14
Proposition 4 In both trade and autarky, the marginal health welfare gains
from a more stringent pollution regulation (weakly) decrease with individual
income share ®(i).
Proof: In the case of corner solutions, the marginal pollution e®ect is con-
stant in ®(i). In the interior solution, the marginal pollution e®ect is equal to
¡(±0¡±1d¤
k(i))Q0
k(µ). The result follows from the fact that d¤
k(i) is increasing
in ®(i);8k 2 fA;Tg. ¥
We now wish to compare the importance of the health welfare e®ects of
regulation when moving from autarky to trade. In this respect, two e®ects
oppose each other. One the one hand, there is a higher pollution reduction
e®ect with trade than autarky (proposition 2). On the other hand, indi-
viduals tend to (weakly) increase their private-mitigation e®ort with trade
(proposition 3). After somewhat tedious but straightforward algebra, it can
be veri¯ed that there exists a unique wealth level, denoted _ ®, for which the
marginal health e®ect is non-zero and equal in both trade and autarky. Hence
the following:
Proposition 5 The health welfare e®ect of regulation is strictly more im-
portant with trade than autarky for individuals whose income share is below
some unique value _ ®, while it is (weakly) less important for all the other,
wealthier individuals.
Proof: Note that the marginal health e®ect is strictly higher with trade
for all ®(i) · ®T; that is, for those who cannot a®ord any protection. Con-
versely, ¹ ®A > ¹ ®T implies that it is (weakly) lower with trade for higher wealth
individuals. And for a strictly positive value of the marginal health e®ect,
the trade and autarky values are equal only at _ ®. The proof is complete by
the continuity of the marginal pollution e®ects. ¥
Figure 2 summarizes proposition 5. It can be readily seen that when
trade leads to a specialization in the dirty good, poorer individuals tend to
receive higher health bene¯ts from a more stringent regulation while richer
ones receive lower bene¯ts. But in order to have a complete picture of the
welfare e®ects of regulation, we must also consider its price-income e®ects.
6.2 The price-income welfare e®ects of regulation













Figure 2: Marginal health welfare e®ect versus income share in autarky and
trade
Proposition 6 The marginal price-income e®ect of regulation varies non-
monotonously with income shares. In absolute terms, it is (weakly) increasing
at low income shares (below ¹ ®) and decreasing at high income shares (above
¹ ®).
Proof: The marginal price-income e®ects of regulation are given by the ¯rst
terms between square brackets in (46) for all income shares. Taking the
derivatives with respect to ®(i) yields the results.¥
Proposition 7 In absolute terms, the marginal price-income e®ect of regu-
lation is more important with trade than autarky for all income shares below
or equal to ¹ ®T, as well as for arbitrarily large income shares.
Proof: The marginal price-income e®ects of regulation are given by the ¯rst
terms between square brackets in (46) for all income shares. For ®(i) 2
[0; ¹ ®T], the result is obtained by substituting for ºA = 1 ¡ a and ºT = 1,16
and for e¤
A(i) and e¤
A(i) in (17) and (19). For ®(i) > ¹ ®A, one can verify that
lim®(i)!1 dV ¤
k (i)=dµ = ¡ºk=(1 ¡ µ), 8k 2 fA;Tg. The result follows from
the fact that ºT > ºA.¥
Note that for intermediate income shares directly above ¹ ®T, we cannot
say anything de¯nite concerning the price-income e®ect of trade. Figure 3














Figure 3: Marginal price-income welfare e®ect versus income share in autarky
and trade
7 Trade regimes and the demand for environmental regulation
We would now like to analyze how trade openness a®ects the aggregate de-
mand for environmental regulation. In this section, we consider the local
e®ects of regulation on welfare; that is, we take the regulation level as given
and compare the net marginal e®ect of regulation on welfare when moving
from autarky to trade. In a later section, we shall consider global e®ects.
Note that in our analysis of the aggregate demand for regulation, we
adopt a broader view than the sole change in the number of individuals
who demand stricter or laxer regulation. Indeed, we shall consider explicitly
variations in the intensity { or depth { of individual demands. To this end,
we consider how a shift from autarky to trade a®ects the relative magnitudes17
of the price-income and the health e®ects of regulation for all income shares.
We ¯rst have the following result:
Proposition 8 The proportion of individuals that demand more environ-
mental regulation is lower with trade than autarky.
Proof: Let ~ ®k denote the wealth level of an individual who is marginally
indi®erent between more or less regulation, given µ. From (46), it can be
veri¯ed that ~ ®k, if it exists, is unique and must be in an interior solution with
respect to the pollution-mitigation e®ort. Moreover, ~ ®k necessarily exists if
there are some individuals who would prefer strictly more environmental
regulation. ~ ®k must be such that the price-income and health e®ects are
equal; that is,
~ ® ^ Z2
e¤
k(i)
= (±0 ¡ ±1d
¤
k(i))¡
0(µ) ^ Z2: (47)




T(i). Hence, the LHS
of (47) is higher with trade than autarky while the converse holds for the
RHS. An indi®erent individual in autarky will see his price-income e®ect of
regulation strictly exceed the health e®ect with trade and specialization in
the dirty good. The proof is made complete by the fact that the price-income
e®ect increases with ®(i) while the opposite holds for the health e®ect.¥
This proposition may appear counter-intuitive. Even though trade results
in a more polluted environment, some individuals who preferred more strin-
gent regulation in autarky now prefer less. But recall that higher pollution
constitutes only one channel through which trade a®ects the demand for reg-
ulation. One must also consider the price-income e®ect and the change in the
pollution-mitigation e®ort. Under the assumptions of our model, the shift
of expenditures from consumption to private mitigation induced by trade's
higher pollution and income gains makes individuals in the interior solution
for d¤
A(i) more sensitive to the price-income losses from regulation in com-
parison to the health gains. Given µ, the indi®erent individual in autarky
thus becomes strictly negatively a®ected by a marginal increase in regula-
tion with trade. One may thus be tempted to infer that trade leads to less
stringent regulation. But this assumes that regulation choices be driven by
numbers only. We believe that a more complete view should account for
changes in intensity of preferences. In this respect, we have the following
two propositions:18
Proposition 9 For lower income individuals, the intensity of the demand
for additional regulation increases with trade.
Proof: For all those whose pollution mitigating-e®ort is nil with trade, the
gap between the marginal pollution e®ect and the marginal price-income ef-
fect is higher by a factor 1=(1 ¡ a) when opening up to trade; their demand
for additional regulation is thus more intense with trade. Among those who
protect themselves partially, we have determined that income share ~ ®T de-
notes the marginally indi®erent individuals with trade and that the same
individuals demanded strictly more regulation in autarky; the intensity of
their demand for additional regulation has decreased with trade. By con-
tinuity of both marginal e®ect curves, an income share must exist which is
comprised strictly between ®T and _ ®T and for which the intensity of the
demand for additional regulation is equal in both autarky and trade.¥
Proposition 10 The intensity of the demand for less regulation increases
with trade for the highest income individuals and for a range of intermediate
income levels.
Proof: Concerning the wealthiest individuals, we have seen that for arbi-
trarily large income shares, the health e®ect is nil while the price-income
e®ect increases with trade (proposition 7). Concerning intermediate income
shares, it can be veri¯ed that although the price-income e®ect of regulation
peaks at ¹ ®k in both trade and autarky, its magnitudes is higher with trade
than autarky. Hence, by continuity of the curves, individuals with income
shares located next to ¹ ®k on both sides are more severely and negatively
a®ected by regulation with trade than autarky.¥
On the one hand, we obtain that trade reduces the number of people de-
manding more regulation (proposition 8). On the other hand, trade increases
the intensity of the demand for more stringent regulation stemming from the
poorest individuals (propositions 9), while simultaneously increasing the in-
tensity of the demand for less stringent regulation stemming from the richest
individuals, as well as for some intermediate income levels (proposition 10).
Now, if one sees regulation choices as the outcome a political bargaining
process between di®erent income groups, then merely looking at changes at
the number of individuals who demand more regulation may not su±ce; one
must also account for individual sensitivities to regulation. In this respect,19
we are left with an indeterminacy concerning the impact of trade on the
stringency of environmental regulation to be adopted by policy makers. The
outcome will depend on how political bargaining weighs in the variations in
sensitivities, as well as on the number of individuals. In this respect, the
following result shall prove relevant for our understanding of the impact of
trade on the adoption of environmental regulation.
Proposition 11 Trade exacerbates the divergence of interests over environ-
mental regulation between low and high income individuals.
Proof: It derives directly from propositions 9 and 10.¥
The essence of those results are illustrated in ¯gure 4, where it is assumed
that the following inequality holds: 1=(1¡µ) < ¡±0Q0
T(µ), which implies that



















¹ ®T ~ ®T ~ ®A
Figure 4: Health and price-income e®ects versus income shares and trade
regime
In this section, we analyzed the e®ects of marginal variations of envi-
ronmental regulation on individual welfare. It allowed us to decompose the20
welfare e®ects of regulation into its various sub-components. This proce-
dure yields a clearer picture of the sources of interest divergence that may
exist between individuals of di®ering income levels when it comes to their
demands for environmental regulation and the interactions with trade open-
ness. Marginal analysis, however, does not permit us to capture people's
global preferences over regulation levels and trade regimes combined. The
following section addresses this question.
8 Environmental regulation, welfare and the demand for trade
In order to conduct a global welfare analysis, we have performed simulations
assuming that regulation a®ects pollution levels as per the following speci¯c
form:
h(µ) = 1 ¡ µ: (48)
Furthermore, depending on parameter values, many case scenarios are pos-
sible. We have chosen to discuss one which we found especially illuminating
with the following list of parameter values:
b = 1 : a production technology parameter;
^ Z2 = 3 : a measure of total factor endowment;
a = 0:5 : a preference parameter;
±0 = 1 and ±1 = 0:2 : private pollution-mitigation technology parameters;
pT = 0:1 : the world price of good 1.
Recall that a priori, individuals di®er only by their relative income shares
®(i). Ultimately, individual welfare di®ers by choices over consumption and
pollution mitigation. Figure 4 reports the equilibrium welfare levels attained
by three types of individuals, referred to as low-, average-, and high-income,
for all regulation levels and for both autarky and trade. Average and high
incomes are respectively 1:5 and 3:5 times higher than the low income. The
world price of good 1 being set at 0:1, it follows that when the regulation level
reaches µ = 0:9, production shifts specialization from the dirty to the clean
good. With trade, welfare at µ = 0:9 corresponds the level when only the
clean good is produced in the small open economy and there is no pollution
as a result. Welfare levels are thus constant for all µ 2 (0:9;1). Here is a list
of observations that can be drawn from this economy:21
FIGURE 4 HERE
a) Individuals with average to high income prefer trade over autarky at any
given stringency of pollution regulation.
b) If pollution regulation is su±ciently stringent, low-income individuals also
prefer trade over autarky. But they prefer autarky over trade when reg-
ulation is too lax.
c) Individuals with average to low income globally prefer a regulation level
equal to µ = 0:59; that is, for both autarky and trade.
d) In autarky, high-income individuals also prefer a regulation level at µ =
0:59. But with trade, they prefer no regulation at all.
e) Individuals with average to low income prefer autarky with a regulation
level around µ = 0:59, over trade with very lax regulation.
We therefore note that even though both the rich and the poor prefer
trade over autarky, they do not see trade with the same eyes. While the
rich prefer trade over autarky at any regulation levels, the poor see trade
as bene¯cial only when su±cient pollution controls are put in place. But
more importantly, the rich prefer a lax regulation level with trade which
makes the poor worse o® than in autarky. Hence, not only do all groups'
globally preferred regulation level coincide in autarky, but at that regulation
level, all demand trade openness. One may thus be tempted to conclude
that interests converge when it comes to trade and regulation issues. The
problem is that once the trade regime is in place, interests over regulation may
diverge. In anticipation of this, lower-income groups may try to block trade
liberalization unless they can obtain a guarantee that pollution controls will
remain in place with trade. Whether and how this can be achieved remains
an open question. Indeed, for a country where the disadvantaged have little
say over regulation, opposition to trade will mount even though trade has
the potential to improve everyone's welfare. It is not trade per se which is
being opposed, but rather the trade-cum-regulation package. As a result, the
disadvantaged may sadly be missing an opportunity to improve their lot with
the potential gains from trade.22
9 Implications for the study of the political economy of the
environment-trade-welfare nexus
The previous two sections carry with them signi¯cant implications for the
study of the political economy of the environment-trade-welfare nexus.
First, from section 6 one can see that the conception of, or approach to,
the operation of collective choice - i.e., whether voting is strictly deterministic
on a one person-one vote basis, or depends on uncertainty by the parties in-
volved about how people will behave at the polls - will play an important role
in determining whether the demand for environmental regulation increases
with trade. Given a deterministic view of pure majority rule, as for example
is implied by the use of a median voter model, we have seen that trade leads
to reduced demands for regulation as a result of the predominance of the
health e®ect: trade increases incomes, and there are more people who want
the higher welfare that comes from trade with reduced environmental regu-
lation provided that this is accompanied by more intensive private pollution
mitigation.
But if this idealized view of collective choice, where intensity of prefer-
ence does not matter, is replaced with a more sophisticated view, such as
a probabilistic spatial voting model (see for example Coughlin and Nitzan
1981, Hinich and Munger 1994, Hettich and Winer 1999 or Adams, Merrill
and grofman 2005) then it could go the other way. It is well known that
in a spatial voting model, uncertainty by the parties about how people will
vote opens the door for intensity of preference to play a role in determining
the collective choice outcome. This follows as long as we reasonably assume
that citizens will be more likely to vote for a party's platform the higher the
individual welfare that (the party thinks) results from this platform, given
that of the opposition. We may make this approach even more realistic by
allowing for the fact that some groups of voters are more in°uential than
others as a result of the problems of organizing collective action of various
kinds.12
Then, as propositions 9 and 10 show, the e®ect of trade on demands for
environmental regulation are more di±cult to predict. Now the interests of
the rich and the poor diverge - the rich want more trade with less regulation
(and will protect themselves), while the poor want more trade and associated
12For an exploration of the importance of the di®erence between economic interests and
political in°uence, see Hotte and Winer (2001).23
higher incomes, but prefer internalization of environmental externalities via
government action. Moreover, the rich want less regulation more intensely
with trade, while the opposite is the case for the poor. So modeling the
outcome requires that we specify how the political system e®ectively weights
these di®erent groups.
The second implication follows from the observation in section 8 that one
cannot predict demands for trade without also knowing what environmental
regulation is to accompany trade openness. Heterogeneity of interests is
also crucial here: the poor want more trade and the extra income that goes
with it, but only if there is su±cient regulation to deal with environmental
externalities. Richer votes want more trade too, but without regulation. This
means that for an understanding of the demand for trade, it is necessary
to understand the choice of at least two policy instruments: regulation of
environmental externalities, and regulation of the degree of trade openness
(as, for example, through a tari® or nontari® barrier). Furthermore, since
these instruments are not linked by a government budget or other constraint,
it is necessary to cope with a multi-dimensional issue space of the sort that
a median voter model cannot deal with.
In his interesting survey of work on trade integration, Verdier (2004)
argues that trade openness a®ects a government's ability to redistribute, so
that it is not possible to discuss the politics of globalization without also
considering those of internal redistribution. Our analysis is analogous while
being more speci¯c: the demands for regulation of the environment and
for regulation of trade are intimately connected and so must be considered
together.
10 Conclusions
In the analytical framework we have proposed, the heterogeneous demands
for regulation of environmental externalities among citizens of di®erent in-
comes depend importantly on the cost of private mitigation. To better isolate
this key role of private mitigation, we have broken the link between factor
endowments and citizen interests employed in much of the existing literature
on trade and the environment. This is because private mitigation depends
solely on total individual income, regardless of its source.24
We have shown that trade with specialisation in the dirty good may
polarize interests between the wealthy and the poor when it comes to envi-
ronmental regulation. This is because even though trade increases pollution,
the possibility of using some of the extra income for private pollution mit-
igation may allow the wealthiest to actually be less a®ected by pollution.
Poorer individuals may not be in a position to a®ord such protection against
pollution even after bene¯tting from trade gains.
It follows from this analysis of the demands for regulation that the de-
mands for trade openness are also heterogeneous. For it matters what kind
of trade - with what degree of internalization via regulation - one is con-
sidering when analyzing who is in favor and who is against more openness.
For instance, we have shown that even when all could simultaneously bene¯t
from trade openness, lower income individuals may try to block trade if they
anticipate that wealthy individuals will push for lax environmental regulation
with trade.
The heterogeneity of demands among the population, both in direction
and with respect to intensity of preference, poses interesting challenges for
the study of the political economy of the environment and trade. Heterogene-
ity of demands cannot be dealt with by using a median voter model if one
thinks that collective action does take intensity of preference into account.
Nor can a complete model be content with the analysis of just one policy
instrument - both regulation of the environment and of trade openness are
clearly connected.
In this paper, the multi-dimensionality of the policy issue space is ¯nessed
by focusing on the demands for regulation, and for trade openness given
regulation, without specifying a full political equilibrium. We think that the
careful analysis has helped to reveal the directions in which it will be fruitful
to move in characterizing a full, multi-dimensional political analysis of the
environment-trade-welfare nexus.25
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Figure 4 : Income level, trade regime and regulation stringency 
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